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I. NO CONTRACTS
Contracts have been a central feature of western law for at least a
thousand years, and they form an extremely important part of American
legal practice. However, American law schools virtually never teach the
subject. As far as I am aware, there is no law school that includes a
course on contracts in its first-year curriculum. A few teach contracts as
an upper level elective that a small number of students take, but even
this very limited exposure to the subject is probably restricted to a
minority of law schools.
To be sure, there is a course called Contracts that is included in the
first-year curriculum of every law school, but this is not a course in
* University of Pennsylvania Law School. I want to thank all the participants in
the AALS Section on Socio-Economics, and particularly Robert Ashford, for educating
me about this subject.

55

RUBIN.DOC

9/17/2019 2:56 PM

contracts at all. It is a course in judicial adjudication of disputes regarding
contracts. In learning how courts resolve these disputes, students
naturally get a glimpse of some of the underlying issues involved in
contracts themselves, just as a course that explored the way courts
resolve disputes about buildings would give students a glimpse of civil
engineering. However, such a course would not be considered a “Civil
Engineering” course, and the course taught in law schools that is labeled
“Contracts” is not a contracts course. Most of the students who take this
course never read even a single contract, and even fewer read a thirty- or
forty-page “long form” contract of the sort that is common in transactions
between firms, or a “standard form” contract that firms commonly use in
consumer transactions.1 Similarly, most of these students are never
given any instruction about the way to negotiate a contract,2 to draft a
contract, or even to interpret a contract during the time when the contract
is governing the relationship between the parties. Their exposure to the
subject begins at the point when the contractual relationship between the
parties has broken down.
This disconnect between contractual relationships and the law school
“Contracts” course is illustrated by the structure of contemporary legal
practice. In most large firms, the bulk of the contract work is carried out
by the corporate department. It is this department that negotiates
contracts, drafts contracts, and interprets contracts during the course of
the contractual relationship between the parties. If the relationship
breaks down, however, and one of the parties files suit against the other
to enforce its rights under the contract, the corporate lawyers who have
worked on the contract will typically refer the matter to the litigation
department of the firm. Sometimes, this is motivated by the corporate
lawyers’ desire to avoid getting involved in the inevitably unpleasant
process of litigation, and thus alienating a good client, but the principal
reason why corporate lawyers refer contract litigation to a separate
department is that litigation is regarded as a distinctly different expertise.
Law schools provide students with a good deal of training in this area of
expertise. In addition to contract litigation, they teach torts litigation,
property litigation, criminal law litigation, constitutional law litigation,
civil procedure, criminal procedure, evidence, and a variety of other
1. There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A.
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 724
(3d ed. 1997) (providing the text of a contract for analysis); see also Robert A. Hillman,
Enriching Case Reports, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1197, 1203–04 (2000) (discussing how
supplementing case reports with documents from practice enriches a contracts course).
2. Again, some contracts teachers use negotiation exercises. See Peter W.
Salsich, Jr., A Property Law Instructor Looks at the Contract Law Course, 44 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 1215, 1222–23 (2000).
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litigation related courses. But they do not teach contracts.
Why do law schools overlook this enormously important subject?
Why have they done so for over one hundred years, ever since the
inception of the modern legal curriculum, without seeming to notice the
omission that their students will rapidly discover upon graduation, if
they have not already done so during their summer jobs at law firms?
No explicit rationale for this omission can be found in the descriptive
literature of any law school, nor is there any rationale that can be readily
inferred from the stated mission of these institutions. Elementary
schools avoid teaching particle physics because it is beyond the intellectual
capacities of their students, public policy schools avoid teaching
techniques for bribing public officials because they are immoral,
psychology departments avoid teaching phrenology because it is invalid,
and medical schools avoid teaching romantic poetry because it is outside
their area of concern. Educators in these institutions could readily offer
these rationales if they were asked to justify their exclusions, but none of
these rationales can explain why law schools fail to teach contracts.
Rather, the explanation, as for so many of the other pedagogic lacunae
in modern legal education, lies with C.C. Langdell. Like many legal
scholars of his day, Langdell believed that the law, and more specifically
the common law, was animated by enduring principles that inhered in
Anglo-American legal culture.3 These principles, profound and recondite,
were not directly articulated by any government authority, but emerged
in the course of judicial adjudication. Students could discern them by
reading adjudicatory records, that is, appellate decisions. Langdell’s
spectacularly influential pedagogic method was based upon this theory.
In his view, when students read appellate decisions, they were
conducting primary research into the visible manifestations of the law’s
enduring principles, just as natural scientists researched the enduring
principles of nature by observing chemical reactions in the laboratory.4
3. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2, 53
(1983) (discussing how Langdell and his colleagues promulgated a distinctive system of
legal thought, called classical orthodoxy); Dennis Patterson, Langdell’s Legacy, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 196, 203 (1995) (analyzing Langdell’s legacy as an explanatory approach to
the nature of law); G. Edward White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880–
1910, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 220–25 (1978) (describing Langdell’s conception of legal
science as both a revolutionary change in methods of acquiring knowledge and a static,
dogmatic orthodoxy).
4. See WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 23–59 (1982); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 51–53 (1983).
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When law professors interrogated the students in class about the internal
logic of the decisions, they were amplifying and refining the
understanding that the students derived from their research. Of course,
no one believes in Langdell’s theory of law anymore, so much so that it
is difficult to describe it without lapsing into sarcasm, but the pedagogic
method used in law schools is still based on this concept of law.
Langdell’s pedagogic method focuses entirely on judicial decisions.
This has the virtue of using primary source material, rather than the dullas-dishwater treatises that still dominate legal education in Europe, but it
does not provide a way of including any other primary source material.
In particular, it does not include contracts. While the Langdellian
method can be used to teach contract adjudication—in fact, “contracts”
was Langdell’s subject—it cannot be used to teach students about
contracts themselves. A contract is an agreement between two private
parties which each party enters into for its individual advantage. A
contract is not an effort by a public official to discern the underlying
principles of common law, even though it is often shaped by explicitly
stated legal rules and sometimes shaped by the desire to circumvent
these rules. Thus, a pedagogic methodology that treats its source material
as an effort to discern enduring legal principles will regard contracts as
beneath its notice, the chattering of people too self-interested and
mundane to see anything but shadows on the walls of the cave.
Legal thought, to be sure, has evolved a great deal since Langdell. His
approach, now disparagingly labeled formalism, was succeeded by the
legal realists, the legal process school, law and economics, and critical
legal studies.5 Although these movements rejected virtually every element
of formalism, they retained its emphasis on discovering the animating
principles of law and of looking at the law from the perspective of a
public official, most commonly a judge. Legal process asks public officials,
such as constitution drafters and legislators, to allocate authority to the
most competent official decisionmaker and then advises judges to make
the proper decisions on the basis of their competence.6 Law and
economics in its early form asked legislators and, most often, judges to
make decisions on the basis of efficiency, while critical legal studies
asked them to base their decisions on a concern for social justice. All
5. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394–1402 (1996). See
generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY’S END (1995) (describing the historical move from legal modernism, which
was influenced by Langdell, to postmodern forms of jurisprudence such as law and
economics and critical legal studies).
6. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and
Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS li (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994).
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these movements, therefore, regarded legal theory as a framework that
public officials could utilize to reach optimal or at least desirable decisions.
The legal actions of private parties, by negative implication, were
regarded as beyond or beneath the realm of legal theory. These actions
were merely efforts to conform or to evade the legal rules, and lacked
any underlying logic that could be conveyed to law students. Teaching
law students about these private legal actions—how lawyers create
contracts, interpret contracts, advise clients, and negotiate with each
other—could be nothing other than a “how to” course, a set of
instructions about practical tasks that did not belong on the university
curriculum. They were merely plumbing, entirely divorced from legal
theory.
There is, to be sure, a good justification for this point of view. To
teach a body of information as an academic subject, one needs a
generalized methodology of some sort. This is not necessarily a theory,
and certainly not a theory in the sense of a complete explanation that
predicts future occurrences, like quantum electrodynamics. Rather, it is
a unified approach to the subject matter that enables students to answer a
set of evaluative questions. Confronted with a narrative of past
occurrences, history students using the methodology they have been
taught can discuss the nature and reliability of the account, the political,
social, and economic causes of the event it describes, and the effects of
that event on subsequent events. Confronted with a judicial decision,
law students using the methodology they have been taught can identify
the facts of the case, its holding and dicta, the doctrine on which the
judge’s decision is based, and the extent to which the decision is
consistent with other decisions based on the same doctrine. However,
law students did not have any methodology that they could utilize when
confronted with a contract, which is at least one reason why their
teachers have protected them from this embarrassing event. The
contract was regarded as a set of particularized provisions reflecting
nothing more than the parties’ effort to secure their own advantages and
memorialize the idiosyncratic details of their transaction. One might
offer the students some techniques or stratagems for increasing their
client’s advantage, but that mundane level of instruction, akin to a set of
lessons on “How to Improve Your Game of Golf,” was all that could be
done.
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Socioeconomics provides a methodology for understanding contracts.7
Jeffrey Harrison has recently provided an illuminating account of the
way that socioeconomics can inform and expand existing contract
courses.8 In addition, socioeconomics creates the possibility that contracts,
and not merely contract adjudication, can be taught in law schools as an
academic subject. Its merger of economics and sociology provides a
methodology for understanding both contracts negotiated between
business parties and contracts negotiated between businesses and consumers.
At first, one might assume that contracts between business firms would
be analyzed according to the economic branch of socioeconomics
because businesses are presumed to be rational actors, while contracts
involving consumers would lend themselves to sociological analysis.
However, socioeconomics does not merely merge these two fields,
which are, after all, both forms of social science, by simply placing them
side by side. Rather, it represents an interpenetration of the two,
together with other branches of social science, producing a mode of
understanding that simultaneously recognizes the economic and the
social aspects of law and legal action.
Part II of this Article will discuss contracts between businesses, and
Part III will discuss contracts between businesses and individuals. An
individual is a natural person; a business is an organized group of natural
persons acting collectively. It is assumed that any such organized group
is a business, even if it is not designed to serve commercial purposes,
such as a church or a fraternal society, and no matter how small, such as
a two person partnership. An individual acting in a professional capacity,
such as a solo doctor or attorney, is a consumer, not a business, and a
family is a set of separate individuals. Businesses contract with each
other as businesses, or organizations, and individuals contract with
businesses in the role of consumer or supplier, usually of their labor but
sometimes of a creative or other product. Individuals also contract with
other individuals, most often in specialized markets such as real estate or
used cars. For simplicity, however, labor contracts and consumer-toconsumer contracts will not be discussed.

7. For general descriptions of socioeconomics, see Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics:
What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 611; Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and
Socioeconomics, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 224 (1999).
8. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Teaching Contracts from a Socioeconomic Perspective, 44
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1233 (2000). Some of Harrison’s proposals are similar to those in this
Article in that Harrison’s proposals would introduce transactional elements. See id. at
1244–46 (describing a professor’s inclusion of empirical studies dealing with consumer
contracts for cars and the activities of corporate counsel in the professor’s classroom
discussions).
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II. BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS CONTRACTS
A. Transaction Cost Economics
By and large, contracts belong to the world of commerce, and the
particular social science that focuses on this realm is economics.
Neoclassical economics was still the dominant approach to this subject
when interdisciplinary legal scholarship began to supplant the legal
process school in the 1970s. According to the neoclassic model, a
contract is an exchange between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
Such an exchange will occur whenever the buyer values something that
the seller owns more highly than the seller does. For example, a person
who has just bought a new car may place a much lower value on her old
car than another person who has no car. The difference between these
two values constitutes a surplus that can be realized by making the
exchange, that is, by transferring the car to the person who values it
more highly. This surplus, according to the neoclassic model, will be
divided between the parties in accordance with their bargaining ability
and a variety of other factors. From a public policy viewpoint, the
division of the surplus is not important. What is important is that courts
be available to enforce the contract, thereby giving the moving party the
benefit of its bargain. The reason is that the bargain, being an exchange
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, is efficient, which means
that it increases social welfare. However, there are various circumstances
under which a bargain will be inefficient, including cases in which one
of the parties is not willing to make the exchange, but does so under
duress or as a result of a misunderstanding, or cases in which the market
for the item being transferred fails due to the presence of a monopoly,
externalities, or information asymmetry.
The absorption of neoclassic economics into legal scholarship resulted
in a major shift in the standards for evaluating the judicial enforcement
of contracts. Instead of focusing on either the fairness or the doctrinal
coherence of a court’s decision, scholars began to focus on its efficiency.
However, the emphasis remained on judicial enforcement. To some
extent, this was the result of the tendentious quality that Richard Posner
imparted to the fledgling field of law and economics through his desire
to refute the tenets of liberalism,9 but there were at least two more basic
reasons. The first was the assumption that the overarching goal of
9.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4–6 (1972).
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efficiency would be served as long as the parties were willing actors; the
particular way in which the surplus was divided was of no concern from
the efficiency or public policy perspective. Thus, the contract itself—its
terms, its structure, and the negotiating strategy of the parties—remained
a sort of black box, walled off from analytic consideration by its asserted
efficiency. The second reason was the assumption, labeled legal
centralism by Oliver Williamson, that “efficacious rules of law regarding
contract disputes were in place and were applied by the courts in an
informed, sophisticated, and low-cost way.”10 To the extent that this
was not the case, it could be corrected, in Posner’s view, by convincing
courts to use economic efficiency as the basis for deciding contract
cases. As a result of these assumptions, neoclassic economics provided
a new methodology for analyzing the familiar subject of judicial contract
adjudication, but like formalism, failed to offer a methodology for the
analysis of contracts themselves.
By the early 1980s, it had become apparent to many economists and
legal scholars that both these assumptions were false, even with respect
to contracts between businesses. Litigation is expensive and courts lack
the knowledge to interpret contracts in a reliable manner; as a result, the
parties strive to avoid litigation by drafting contracts that are selfenforcing.11 This means, in turn, that a business-to-business contract is
not merely an effort to divide a transactional surplus and submit oneself
to judicial enforcement, but rather a means of private ordering, an effort
to organize a commercial relationship to achieve a complex variety of
purposes. As a result of this insight, the contract itself—its creation, its
terms, its role in the ongoing relationship between the parties—becomes
an important subject for economic and legal analysis.
Transaction cost economics, developed by Williamson, Ronald Coase,
Douglass North, Armen Alchian, Benjamin Klein, and others, is the
economics of suboptimality.12 Given economies of scale, as Coase
10.
11.

OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 42 (1996).
IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 4–5 (1980) (describing contract as exchange relations and
discussing how such exchange relations do not always give rise to legal rights); Marc
Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 2–17 (1981) (submitting that legal centralism is deficient and
arguing that the most significant legal traffic is the centrifugal flow of legal messages,
rather than a centripetal flow of cases into official forums); Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL.
ECON. 615, 616 (1981); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS.
27, 27–28 (1980).
12. For representative statements, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 2 (1985);
Armen A. Alchian, Specificity, Specialization, and Coalitions, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 34, 36, 38–39 (1984); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost
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pointed out, the only reason why the entire world is not organized into a
single, all-embracing firm is that organizational difficulties produce
countervailing diseconomies.13 In particular, the firm’s hierarchical
structure undermines its members’ incentives to be efficient, and the
opportunities within the hierarchy for excessive intervention and
inappropriate resistance allow inefficient behaviors to prevail. Given the
ability to transfer property by contract, as Coase also pointed out, the
only reason why property arrangements make an economic difference is
that transaction costs impede the contracting process.14 In particular,
uncertainty about future states, people’s inabilities to process information,
and people’s incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior make
transactions costly. Because people are only rational within certain
bounds and their information processing abilities are limited, these
organizational and contractual suboptimalities persist over time and are
never fully “cleared” by the market. Because people are opportunistic
and think they can gain an advantage from ambiguity, and because
money and effort are required to achieve clarity, contracts are often
incomplete, that is, they do not even take advantage of the information
that is actually available to the parties.15
B. Analyzing Business Contracts
Transaction cost economics, by addressing these issues, provides a
methodology for analyzing contracting behavior. To begin with, it
provides a framework for understanding why businesses use contracts at
all. A contract is an intermediate device between no relationship, or a
purely competitive relationship, and a hierarchical relationship in an
integrated organization or firm.16 Businesses enter into contracts because
they want to bind each other to a particular relationship, either for a
Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 356,
361–62 (1980) (discussing the transaction costs of incomplete contracts due to
uncertainty and measurement costs); Douglass C. North, Transaction Costs, Institutions,
and Economic History, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 7, 7, 10 (1984).
13. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM:
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 18, 23 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G.
Winter, eds., 1991).
14. Id. at 35, 48; R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–19
(1960).
15. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 9–10 (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS]; WILLIAMSON, supra note
12, at 64–67.
16. See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 15, at 8–10.
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single transaction, a delimited series of transactions, or a long-term
relationship, without joining together in a single firm. Conversely, a
single firm decides whether to produce something itself or contract with
a separate party—the “make-or-buy” decision—by balancing its ability
to reach a satisfactory agreement with another party against the
organizational complexities of internal production. Often the decision
turns on the extent to which the production process in question involves
advance commitments that are irreversible and unsalvageable, such as
locating a facility near an existing resource, building a machine to
produce a particular product, or training a group of workers to engage in
a particular process.17 When such asset specificity is necessary, or more
precisely, when it has the potential to produce the product at a lower
price than reliance on reversible and salvageable assets, there will be an
incentive to engage in long-term contracting in order to obtain the
commitments necessary to secure the irreversible asset’s value.
These insights, which can be explained in straightforward, nonmathematical
terms (always an important goal in dealing with law students) can be
used in the classroom to analyze actual contracts. Presented with a
contract, the students can be asked why the firm is contracting for this
particular product or service and why it is entering into the particular
kind of contract that they see in front of them. For example, a contract
for sale of a patent by one firm to another might contain an option
clause, whereby the buyer pays a relatively small amount to control the
patent for a one-year period and then has the option, upon payment of a
larger amount, to buy the patent outright. Students can be asked to
explain why the buyer would not want to pay the entire purchase price at
once due to uncertainty, how the buyer could reduce uncertainty through
initial utilization of the patent, how such utilization would involve
irreversible, unsalvageable expenditures that would place the seller in a
position to act opportunistically unless the buyer had an option to secure
the entire patent, and why the seller could obtain a higher price by
agreeing to the option than it could by selling the patent outright in the
first instance. The students might also be given secondary source
readings about a given industry—biotechnology, for example—that
would explain how firms decide whether to purchase patents or generate
their own discoveries. To take one more example, the students could be
shown long-term requirements contracts, of the sort discussed by
Macneil,18 and asked to explain why the buyer would want to obtain a
17. Klein & Leffler, supra note 11, at 618–19; Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297, 308–09, 313 (1978).
18. IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 859–
71 (2d ed. 1978).
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commitment from the seller and why the seller would agree.
Transaction cost economics also provides a methodology for explaining
the terms that appear in business-to-business contracts. Most of these
contracts follow a standard pattern: (1) identify the parties, (2) describe
the transaction, (3) state the price, (4) specify the means of payment, (5)
list the representations and warranties made by the seller and, less
frequently, the buyer, (6) list the covenants and conditions being made by
the parties, and (7) state enforcement oriented terms, such as an arbitration
or choice of law clause. In a pathbreaking article, Ronald Gilson
explains that these contractual provisions, as drafted by attorneys, are
designed to reduce transaction costs.19 Gilson uses the standard form
corporate acquisition contract as his example. If the parties could agree
upon the value of the firm being transferred, they could simply record
that value in dollar form, and the contract drafter’s task would be
essentially secretarial. The contract would go forward under the
neoclassic model because the firm, at its agreed upon value, was worth
more to the buyer than the seller, perhaps because of synergies with
other parts of the buyer’s firm. In many cases, however, the buyer and
the seller disagree about the value of the firm, or more specifically, the
earning power of the firm in the immediate future. The lawyer might
then draft a contractual provision that allows the seller to remain in
control of the firm for a one-year period, have the buyer pay what it
thinks the firm is worth at the beginning of the year, and then require the
buyer to pay some additional amount if the firm’s performance reflects
the seller’s higher estimate of its earning power. As Gilson points out,
however, this solution creates an incentive problem because the seller,
anxious to demonstrate the earning power of its firm, might engage in
short-term practices to enhance earnings during the one-year period, at
the expense of the firm’s long-term value. To guard against this
possibility while preserving the advantages of the variable pricing term,
the attorney would need to draft conditions and covenants governing the
seller’s managerial practices.20
Williamson provides another example of contractual devices to reduce
transaction costs. Asset specificity allows a firm to produce a product at
lower cost, as described above, but makes the firm vulnerable to the
other firms that purchase the product for resale. If these firms fail to buy
19. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984).
20. Id. at 265–67.
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the product, the value of the seller’s specific asset can be lost; knowing
this, potential buyers are in a position to act opportunistically, to the
seller’s disadvantage. The seller, and its attorney, can reduce this risk by
drafting a contract that requires the buyer to pay a cancellation fee, and
the buyer will agree to such a term in order to obtain the lower price items
generated by the specific asset. Williamson describes such mechanisms
as hostage taking on the seller’s part. They are a form of self-help and
thus a recognition of the costs and uncertainties that legal centralism
tends to ignore.21 Another more comprehensive strategy to deal with the
same problem of asset specificity is for the seller to contract with
multiple buyers through franchise agreements, which are essentially
agreements imposing a condition that each buyer invest in specific assets
of its own.22 Such agreements can be regarded as a mutual exchange of
hostages.
The examples given thus far involve negotiated terms. Most business
contracts, however, are based on forms contracts that circulate among
attorneys in an industry, or that are promulgated by trade organizations
such as the American Institute of Architects or the Dramatists’ Guild.23
The prevalence of these forms is also explained by transaction cost
economics, as Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan have shown.24 First,
and most obviously, drafting a contract is itself a transaction cost. This
cost will be counterbalanced by transaction cost savings achieved by the
negotiated terms when the relationship between the parties possesses
distinctive or idiosyncratic features, but it will be minimized by using
standard forms when the relationship is stereotypical. In virtually every
transfer of rights from a writer to a publisher, for example, the publisher
will want to secure the same set of written publication rights, and will
want the same representations and warranties regarding the originality of
the work. Even more important, the rejection of legal centralism recognizes
that courts often misinterpret contracts in unpredictable ways. Using a
standard form reduces this uncertainty because the contracts incorporating
its terms have already been litigated, and the judicial response to them is
21. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521–22, 524 (1983).
22. Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 931–32 (1990).
23. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 762 (1995); Edward L. Rubin, The Phenomenology of Contract:
Complex Contracting in the Entertainment Industry, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 123, 130–31 (1996); Eric Schanze, Legalism, Economism, and Professional Attitudes
Toward Institutional Design, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 122 (1993).
24. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 347, 361–62 (1996); Klausner, supra note 23, at 826–29.
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known. Thus, as Klausner points out, standard contract forms, like
telephones, provide a positive network externality; the item becomes
more valuable to each person as more people use it.25
Here again, students can be provided with the texts of these various
agreements, given guidance about how to read them—just as law school
begins with guidance about how to read a case—and then asked to
analyze the contract’s provisions. Transaction cost economics provides
a framework for this analysis. It explains that various contract terms that
appear, from the neoclassic perspective, as merely profit-maximizing
efforts to divide a contractual surplus, in fact respond to an underlying
logic driven by uncertainty, the bounded nature of rationality and the
consequent suboptimality of firms and markets. With a relatively simple
set of concepts, students can understand why the parties used a standard
form contract or a specially negotiated one, what the buyer and seller
were trying to achieve with a particular term, why they insisted on that
term, and why they were willing to accept it or modify it in particular
ways. The students can read a contract as they now read a case,
assessing the decisions made by the person who wrote the document
according to a conceptual framework.
To be sure, the conceptual framework for analyzing business-tobusiness contracts is more limited. The motivations that underlie the
contract drafter’s efforts are generally limited to maximizing her client’s
wealth and do not include more wide-ranging questions about public
policy and social justice that sometimes animate a judge. On the other
hand, the study of contracts presents an active learning opportunity that
is absent from the study of judicial decisions. Practicing lawyers do not
draft judicial opinions; as a result, opinion drafting is generally not
regarded as a relevant part of law school courses, which are conceptualized
as an effort to teach students how to be practicing lawyers. Rather, the
students are taught how to interpret contracts, a somewhat passive
enterprise. But practicing lawyers draft contracts all the time, and it
would be highly relevant to a contracts course—a real contracts course,
that is—to include drafting exercises. These should not be regarded as
mere “how-to” exercises, although that is certainly important, but as a
means of teaching understanding through participation.26 By drafting a
25.
26.

Klausner, supra note 23, at 772.
For an argument that understanding requires participation, see MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 7–11 (Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1968).
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contract based on a fact pattern about the relationship between the
business parties, students will begin to understand how contract drafters
make decisions and why they use the particular solutions that appear in
actual contracts. If they are then given the future results of the fact
pattern—whether prices went up or down, whether the other party
performed or defaulted—and then asked to compute how their contract
served their client in these circumstances, they can be given a visceral
sense of the uncertainties and informational constraints that shape
contractual practice.
Moreover, judicial decisions are not irrelevant to a real contracts
course. While questions about how judges interpret contracts should be
avoided, the theory of positive network externalities suggests that these
decisions can be viewed from the perspective of the contract drafter.
The question is how firms using a standard form will respond to a
judicial interpretation of that form, particularly if the contract is
incomplete and elicits a significant amount of judicial interpretation.27 If
the interpretation is unexpected and alters the form’s intended purposes,
regular users of the form will typically redraft the interpreted clause to
restore its intended meaning. In some cases, this will not be possible,
and the drafter will need to make other adjustments. Students can be
given the original form contract, the judicial decision, and the revised
version of the form. They can be asked to explain, according to the
methodology of transaction cost economics, why the drafters responded
as they did. By doing so, students will see judicial decisions from the
perspective of those governed by the decision, that is, from the only
perspective that the overwhelming majority of them will experience in
their professional careers and that the small minority who ultimately
become judges will nonetheless experience for their first twenty or thirty
years.
All of this might seem like an application of pure economics to law, even
if it is not neoclassical economics. However, transaction cost economics,
its name notwithstanding, is not pure economics; it is socioeconomics.
Its break with neoclassicism lies precisely in its recognition of
sociological factors involving real human and organizational behavior.
While transaction cost economists often tend to phrase these insights in
economic sounding terms, their approach represents a real combination
of economics, organizational theory, and individual psychology. In
addition, because of the emphasis on the cost of adjudication, the
alternative value of self-help, and the choice between public and private
ordering, law is regarded as an essential element in transaction cost
27. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of
Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159–64 (1994).
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economics, not merely as a field to which economic analysis can be
applied. This integration of law and social science at the level of theory
is another feature of the socioeconomic approach.
III. CONSUMER CONTRACTS
Individuals contract with businesses in various ways, most commonly
in their capacity as employees or consumers. As stated, only consumer
contracts will be considered here; while employment contracts share
many features with the other contracts that will be discussed, they are an
integral part of labor law or employment law28 and can be omitted from
a first-year contracts course on the ground that they would be considered
in upper-class courses.29 Consumer contracts, however, are generally not
considered elsewhere in the curriculum. They represent the overwhelming
majority of contracts in the United States and raise distinct and
interesting issues.
The most notable difference between consumer contracts and
business-to-business contracts is that consumer contracts are virtually
never negotiated. They appear on forms prepared by the business,
generally in its role of seller, and are offered to the consumer on a takeit-or-leave-it basis; in other words, they are contracts of adhesion.30 Of
course, as discussed above, businesses frequently use form contracts as
well, but use of the form generally represents a conscious decision by
business parties, who often modify the form, and almost always consider
modifying it. Consumers virtually never do either of these things.
28. But see Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching Unconscionability Through Agreements
to Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1401, 1401–02 (2000) (asserting
that a contracts course could benefit from a discussion of employment agreements).
29. The more precise statement is that employment contracts should be considered
in labor law and employment law courses. In fact, these courses, like almost all the other
courses taught in law school, generally focus on judicial decisions.
30. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits
of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (discussing how actors characteristically
violate the standard rational-choice or expected-utility model because of the limits of
cognition); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective
Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263 (1993) (describing
special risks and problems of consumer form contracts); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176–77 (1983)
(defining contracts of adhesion and concluding that they ought to be considered
presumptively unenforceable); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971) (constructing
an “administrative law” of standard form contracts that is designed to restore both
fairness and consent to the law of contracts).
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Contracts of adhesion are not necessarily inefficient or unfair. It is
true that consumers generally cannot negotiate the terms of a contract,
but they cannot redesign a car or a television either. The market for
product designs is generally considered efficient because consumers can
shop among alternative models that are offered, and producers, motivated
to maximize their profits, will carefully attend to consumer desires.
There is no a priori reason to assume that consumers cannot engage in
the same shopping behavior with respect to contractual terms. It is
sometimes true that contract terms are harder to understand than product
design, and always true that such terms are less interesting. However, it
is also well accepted among economists that shopping behavior by a
relatively small proportion of consumers is sufficient to create a
competitive market.31 The question is whether such shopping behavior
occurs and whether firms respond to it.
Scholars applying the neoclassical economic model to law have often
tried to answer this question by deductive reasoning.32 They begin with
the premise that the market must work and then argue that consumers
necessarily behave in ways that will enable it to do so. When these
arguments begin to seem implausible, even to true believers, they
buttress them by asserting that consumers who are so irrational that they
will not behave the way a neoclassical economist would predict should
suffer the consequences. Such arguments, of course, reintroduce the
legal moralism, the emphasis on fairness and just results, that law and
economics claims to extirpate. In fact, consumer behavior regarding
form contracts is an empirical question and a question that lends itself to
psychological and sociological analysis.33 Economic discussions of
form contracts that are not informed by these other social sciences are
31. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1347 (1981). But see R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper:
The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 635, 635–36 (1996); Meyerson, supra note 30, at 1270–71.
32. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 31, at 1297–99; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and
Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1392 (1983); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 631 (1979).
33. See William K. Brandt & George S. Day, Information Disclosure and
Consumer Behavior: An Empirical Evaluation of Truth-in-Lending, 7 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 297, 297–99 (1974); Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 212, 213 (noting that
empirical evidence is needed to better understand the bargain principle); Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 638–40 (1999) (utilizing behavioral research to
outline a new model of the human decisionmaker); Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain,
Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the
Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
83, 84 (1997).
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therefore inadequate. In other words, the only approach to consumer
contracts that makes sense is a socioeconomic one.
This socioeconomic approach to consumer contracts, like the transaction
cost economics approach to contracts between businesses, provides a
framework for teaching consumer contracts in a real contracts course.
Once again, the primary source materials should be the contracts
themselves. The content of these contracts can be analyzed according to
the principles of transaction cost economics that were discussed in the
previous section. Students can be asked why the seller chose particular
terms. Very often, the explanation is that the seller wanted to reduce the
uncertainty of judicial interpretation by denying liability, or to reduce
the uncertainty and expense of judicial interpretation by providing selfhelp remedies. Conscientious sellers need to protect themselves against
opportunistic behavior such as nonpayment or the return of merchandise
that is not defective. In addition, they want to establish a framework for
their ongoing relationship with the buyer that will secure brand loyalty
and thus protect the value of specific assets. Less scrupulous sellers want to
reap the maximum profit from a single transaction and are not concerned
about future dealings with the buyer. In addition to this passive process of
interpretation, students can be given the participatory exercise of
drafting a consumer contract. They can be asked to achieve particular
objectives on behalf of either conscientious or unscrupulous sellers.
With consumer contracts, however, questions arise that are generally
not present in business-to-business contracts. These involve the way
that the buyer perceived the seller’s terms. One approach to these
questions is as participatory as contract drafting; students can be asked
to simply read the contract and explain their own understanding of its
terms. Although they are in law school, first-year law students may be
closer to ordinary consumers than to experienced contractual drafters,
and their own comprehension, bewilderment, or boredom will provide
some insight into the problems involved in understanding contractual
terms. They can then be given a few simple articles that describe what is
known about consumer behavior and asked to analyze the contract from
that perspective. The fact that these articles are likely to be drawn from
sociology or social psychology journals is not a sign of their irrelevance
to law, but a recognition that many crucial areas of law, such as the
study of contracts themselves, are best approached on the basis of
socioeconomics.
Having analyzed consumer contracts from the consumer perspective,
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the transaction cost and consumer sociology approaches can then be
combined by asking the students whether the use of particular contracts
is efficient or fair. These considerations lead to the next level of
analysis, which involves consumer protection legislation. During the
past several decades, a number of major federal statutes have been
enacted to regulate consumer contracts, including the Truth in Lending
Act34 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.35 State statutes often track
the federal statutes, but sometimes contain novel provisions. Because
first-year contracts courses are really courses in contract adjudication,
and because the justification for teaching adjudication and not contract is
an emanation of the formalist deification of the common law, these
statutes are not taught, and frequently not mentioned, in first-year
contracts courses.36 Taking account of the Uniform Commercial Code,
and thus acknowledging the awful truth that the common law of
contracts has been largely displaced, represents the largest dose of
reality that most current “Contracts” courses can tolerate.37 In fact,
consumer protection legislation is a major force in shaping consumer
contracts.
This legislation can be analyzed from the drafter’s
perspective in the same way that judicial decisions regarding business
contracts are analyzed. Students can be shown consumer contracts
subject to a particular statute and asked how the drafter responded to its
requirements, and what she did to achieve her client’s original purposes
despite the existence of the statute. Moreover, a real contracts course
can go beyond this perspective and ask whether the legislature should
have enacted the statute on either efficiency or fairness grounds. This does
not present the same dangers as asking whether the judge should have
reached a particular decision, because legislation is also underemphasized in
legal education, whereas the analysis of judicial decisions is its continuing,
unhealthy obsession.

34. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601–13,
1631–41, 1671–77 (2000)).
35. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–
12 (2000)).
36. See H. Miles Foy, III, Legislation and Pedagogy in Contracts 101, 44 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1273, 1274 (2000). Foy, however, limits his discussion to the U.C.C. and
the Restatement of Contracts and does not discuss consumer protection laws.
37. Thus, the U.C.C.’s unconscionability provision, U.C.C. § 2-302, is the only
statutory provision for consumer protection that first-year law students ever see. See
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There was never much excuse for legal education’s failure to teach
contracts. The only excuse that ever made much sense is that there was
no systematic methodology for analyzing contracts, so the study of
contracts seemed too mundane and anecdotal for a graduate program in a
university. Socioeconomics solves this problem by providing a methodology
for analyzing contracts themselves. By combining transaction cost
economics, which is itself a combination of economics, organization
theory, and law, with sociology and social psychology, this interdisciplinary
approach opens a new world for law teachers. Contracts themselves can
join judicial decisions as primary source materials for law students.
Business strategy can be added to judicial decisionmaking. Consumer
legislation can be acknowledged and analyzed. The entire field of
transactional law, a major division of practice and a major concern of
legislative activity, can be opened to the students’ view.
Transforming the existing contracts course along transactional lines,
or to put the matter more bluntly, replacing the existing course with an
entirely new one, is admittedly a daunting proposition, but the transactional
approach can be added to existing “contracts” courses gradually. Form
contracts are readily available, and even negotiated contracts are
generally easy to obtain. Most practicing lawyers have contracts in their
files that can be provided to students with the names redacted, and
contracts that are in litigation become part of the public record without
redaction. Reading even a single contract or engaging in even a single
drafting exercise will provide the students with some sense of what
contracts really are and will make the existing courses on contract
adjudication more concrete and comprehensible for students. Using
socioeconomic analysis for even one such exercise will provide students
with a sense of the relevance and power of this approach.
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